Wireshark-bugs: [Wireshark-bugs] [Bug 11789] New: Wireshark stack-based out-of-bounds read in ge
Bug ID |
11789
|
Summary |
Wireshark stack-based out-of-bounds read in getRate
|
Product |
Wireshark
|
Version |
Git
|
Hardware |
All
|
OS |
All
|
Status |
UNCONFIRMED
|
Severity |
Major
|
Priority |
Low
|
Component |
Capture file support (libwiretap)
|
Assignee |
bugzilla-admin@wireshark.org
|
Reporter |
j00ru.vx@gmail.com
|
Created attachment 14044 [details]
Reproducers.
Build Information:
Wireshark git master.
--
The following crash due to a stack-based out-of-bounds memory read can be
observed in an ASAN build of Wireshark (current git master), by feeding a
malformed file to tshark ("$ ./tshark -nVxr /path/to/file"):
Attached are three files which trigger the crash.
--- cut ---
==2067==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address
0x7ffe26462c20 at pc 0x0000009cf704 bp 0x7ffe26462b70 sp 0x7ffe26462b68
READ of size 4 at 0x7ffe26462c20 thread T0
#0 0x9cf703 in getRate wireshark/wiretap/vwr.c:2276:20
#1 0x9c74f7 in vwr_read_s2_s3_W_rec wireshark/wiretap/vwr.c:1533:25
#2 0x9bc02a in vwr_process_rec_data wireshark/wiretap/vwr.c:2336:20
#3 0x9babf2 in vwr_read wireshark/wiretap/vwr.c:653:10
#4 0x9d64c2 in wtap_read wireshark/wiretap/wtap.c:1314:7
#5 0x535c1a in load_cap_file wireshark/tshark.c:3479:12
#6 0x52c1df in main wireshark/tshark.c:2197:13
Address 0x7ffe26462c20 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 160 in frame
#0 0x9cf32f in getRate wireshark/wiretap/vwr.c:2261
This frame has 6 object(s):
[32, 80) 'canonical_rate_legacy'
[112, 144) 'canonical_ndbps_20_ht'
[176, 208) 'canonical_ndbps_40_ht' <== Memory access at offset 160
underflows this variable
[240, 276) 'canonical_ndbps_20_vht'
[320, 360) 'canonical_ndbps_40_vht'
[400, 440) 'canonical_ndbps_80_vht'
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack
unwind mechanism or swapcontext
(longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow
wireshark/wiretap/vwr.c:2276:20 in getRate
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x100044c84530: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x100044c84540: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x100044c84550: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x100044c84560: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x100044c84570: f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00
=>0x100044c84580: 00 00 f2 f2[f2]f2 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00
0x100044c84590: 00 00 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2
0x100044c845a0: f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00
0x100044c845b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x100044c845c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x100044c845d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Heap right redzone: fb
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack partial redzone: f4
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==2067==ABORTING
--- cut ---
This bug is subject to a 90 day disclosure deadline. If 90 days elapse without
a broadly available patch, then the bug report will automatically become
visible to the public.
You are receiving this mail because:
- You are watching all bug changes.